Projective Cycle
(9º, 10º y 11)
For Piaget, thought evolves from its preoperational level to reach mastery of the inductive and deductive operations characteristic of formal thought. Thus, hypothetical-deductive chains constitute the highest forms of reasoning achieved by human beings. Of course, for him, humans would continue to learn and refine their intellectual processes, but their overall structures essentially remained the same.
Works since Piaget have challenged the above principle and initiated reflection on the cognitive processes characteristic of adulthood (Flavell, 2000; Chi and Glaser, 1986; Carretero et al., 1997; Pozo, 2007; Pozo et al., 1997; Delval, 2006; De Zubiría, M., and De Zubiría, J., 1986). First, and as explained a few pages back, research on experts and novices raised the question of the role of content in intellectual processes and led to the postulate that cognitive operations could not operate independently of the level of content mastery. On the other hand, exponents of the Cultural-Historical school, such as Henry Wallon, postulated the existence of intellectual processes subsequent to those identified by Piaget, which he called categorical and scientific, thereby echoing the Aristotelian idea of dialectical reasoning.
Furthermore, work conducted in the Netherlands (Van Dijk, 1997 and 1998; and Van Eemeren, 1997 and 2006) supported the appropriateness of speaking of branching and hierarchical argumentative structures to characterize the dimension that language could reach in human development.
Van Eemeren's thesis is deeply suggestive, and its application in an innovative institution such as the Alberto Merani Institute has been extremely favorable. For Van Dijk (1997 and 1998), every essay has a microstructure made up of the sentences and propositions explicitly stated in the text, but likewise, every essay has a macrostructure in which the most general and essential propositions are articulated around a thesis or central idea. The function of reading is to cognitively reconstruct the macrostructure in order to initiate a dialogue with the author's ideas. Starting from this, Van Eemeren (1997 and 2006) developed argumentative structures in which various propositions serve as support for a point of view or central idea, and numbered them decimally to indicate the argumentative path in which they were located with respect to the thesis. In this way, an essay is characterized as a hierarchical and organized set of propositions, articulated around a thesis or point of view. And the essential connection between the various propositions and the thesis is argumentative, giving strength to the central idea and supporting it in such a way that the reader can effectively be partially or completely convinced of the idea being argued. The vast majority of scientific essays respond to this argumentative structure described by Van Eemeren.
From the above, it can be inferred that anyone who lacks well-developed argumentative skills will have a very noticeable weakness when reading scientific essays and will have very serious difficulties writing scientific essays. And if this is the case, it would be almost absurd for a student, during the final years of elementary school and in middle school, to have to face the need to write scientific essays without first working on the qualification of the argumentative structures or mental plans of the essays.
In the previous example, a thesis is supported by three arguments, and in turn, arguments 1 and 3 are supported by a set of sub-arguments: two for argument A1 and three for argument A3. According to Van Dijk and Van Eemeren, the above set of propositions constitutes the hierarchical macrostructure of propositions, or what could also be understood as the deep structure of propositions underlying an essay. It is this hierarchical structure that should be requested from a student before beginning to write an essay. The "essay plans" should be required before reviewing the essay itself. The "plan" contains only the essential propositions organized hierarchically. The plan is what Van Dijk calls a hierarchical and organized "macrostructure."
Formal thinking is, as its name indicates, a type of thinking focused on form, on logical coherence; it is therefore a type of thinking concerned with logical coherence, with validity, and not with the truthfulness of statements. As Aristotle explained, it corresponds to analytical reasoning as opposed to dialectical reasoning (Aristotle, 1997, and Perelman, 1977). In this sense, it is a profoundly abstract form of thinking. It is hypothetical by nature and procedural, logical, and devoid of content. If A>B and B>C, then A>C is necessarily the case, regardless of what A, B, and C are. Whether the defined relationship is one of height, extension, volume, knowledge, intelligence, age, energy, or abilities, it does not matter; A>C will always be valid. It is a type of thinking "free" of content, focused on the logical form of relationships.
Argumentative thinking initiates the return to content, an aspect that, as we have said, is abandoned by formal thinking. This means that, as Perelman (1977, 1997 edition: 21) argues, some arguments are better than others, some are trivial and others are deeper, some are theses or points of view are poorly or weakly argued, and some do not meet the condition of the previous step (Weston, 1998 and De Zubiría, 2006b). Argumentative thinking requires the logic inherent in formal thinking, but it does not stop there: it includes content in propositions; and in doing so, it recognizes the nuances, degrees, diversity, and ramifications of reality. For his part, Weston (1998: 135) considers it essential to include definitions in argumentative structures.
Human beings do not think linearly but rather branched, in the form of a tree (Van Eemeren, 2006 and Martínez, 2001). In this way, a proposition is necessarily supported by several propositions. A proposition is not argued exclusively by another, but by a set of propositions.
The two aforementioned characteristics (inclusion of content and branching) represent a significant advance in argumentative thinking over formal thinking. Even so, these advances can become its clearest limitation: by taking content into account, truthfulness is included as a characteristic that can oppose validity, and certainty can hide logical weaknesses, as it introduces nuances and degrees of coherence unacceptable in formal reasoning.
The only way to overcome the aforementioned risks is by understanding that the inclusion of content cannot be detrimental to the logical structure of formal thinking; it is by ensuring rigor and coherence in arguments and derivations. And this can only be achieved through systematic practice. Only in this way can we achieve the dialectical reasoning envisioned by Aristotle.
In Wallon's terms, Projective is a cycle in which the affective dimension predominates. The essential thing will be to develop one's life plan at the ethical, political, ideological, evaluative, and professional levels. The fundamental question is that of identity, one's definition in a given social and cultural context. Because of this, it is an extremely ambivalent and conflictual cycle. Relationships with authority figures in the family and school become strained; and as a result, peers assume the central role. Resatelization is consolidated, and supported by it, the formation of the self takes place at various levels. The social group expands, and the essential task will be to define the role and position the young person will occupy in society. Hence the name we have given to the cycle: Projective. The essential task to be resolved is to develop a personal life plan.
Formal thinking is, as its name indicates, a type of thinking focused on form, on logical coherence; it is therefore a type of thinking concerned with logical coherence, with validity, and not with the truthfulness of statements. As Aristotle explained, it corresponds to analytical reasoning as opposed to dialectical reasoning (Aristotle, 1997, and Perelman, 1977). In this sense, it is a profoundly abstract form of thinking. It is hypothetical by nature and procedural, logical, and devoid of content. If A>B and B>C, then A>C is necessarily the case, regardless of what A, B, and C are. Whether the defined relationship is one of height, extension, volume, knowledge, intelligence, age, energy, or abilities, it does not matter; A>C will always be valid. It is a type of thinking "free" of content, focused on the logical form of relationships.
Argumentative thinking initiates the return to content, an aspect that, as we have said, is abandoned by formal thinking. This means that, as Perelman (1977, 1997 edition: 21) argues, some arguments are better than others, some are trivial and others are deeper, some are theses or points of view are poorly or weakly argued, and some do not meet the condition of the previous step (Weston, 1998 and De Zubiría, 2006b). Argumentative thinking requires the logic inherent in formal thinking, but it does not stop there: it includes content in propositions; and in doing so, it recognizes the nuances, degrees, diversity, and ramifications of reality. For his part, Weston (1998: 135) considers it essential to include definitions in argumentative structures.
Human beings do not think linearly but rather branched, in the form of a tree (Van Eemeren, 2006 and Martínez, 2001). In this way, a proposition is necessarily supported by several propositions. A proposition is not argued exclusively by another, but by a set of propositions.
The two aforementioned characteristics (inclusion of content and branching) represent a significant advance in argumentative thinking over formal thinking. Even so, these advances can become its clearest limitation: by taking content into account, truthfulness is included as a characteristic that can oppose validity, and certainty can hide logical weaknesses, as it introduces nuances and degrees of coherence unacceptable in formal reasoning.
The only way to overcome the aforementioned risks is by understanding that the inclusion of content cannot be detrimental to the logical structure of formal thinking; it is by ensuring rigor and coherence in arguments and derivations. And this can only be achieved through systematic practice. Only in this way can we achieve the dialectical reasoning envisioned by Aristotle.
In Wallon's terms, Projective is a cycle in which the affective dimension predominates. The essential thing will be to develop one's life plan at the ethical, political, ideological, evaluative, and professional levels. The fundamental question is that of identity, one's definition in a given social and cultural context. Because of this, it is an extremely ambivalent and conflictual cycle. Relationships with authority figures in the family and school become strained; and as a result, peers assume the central role. Resatelization is consolidated, and supported by it, the formation of the self takes place at various levels. The social group expands, and the essential task will be to define the role and position the young person will occupy in society. Hence the name we have given to the cycle: Projective. The essential task to be resolved is to develop a personal life plan.